



Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych
Center for International Relations

Edited by

Janusz Onyszkiewicz

“Where Ukraine is heading?”

Sample of conference proceedings

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Towards a New Partnership

NATO and the EU vis`a vis Russia and the Post-Soviet Area

supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation.

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PREFACE,

The Center for International Relations will soon publish a book containing presentations given at a conference “Where Ukraine is heading?”. The conference was held on the 4th and the 5th of April 2003, in the framework of the CIR project *Towards a New Partnership NATO, EU vis `a vis Russia and Post-Soviet Area* supported by the Robert Bosh Foundation.

The meeting was divided into three discussion panels. The first one was devoted to relations between Ukraine and European Union. During the second panel we discussed on the Ukraine – NATO relations and on the issue of democratic control of the armed forces. The last part of the event was entitled “Ukraine and its neighbours”.

The very positive feedback of the event has reassured us that there is a great need among Polish and Ukrainian elites to expand discussions and mutual cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. It showed that conference proceedings, contained in a book, will attract a broad circle of readers among specialists and students. The whole publication will be available at the turn of September and October 2003.

We would like to present you hereby two contributions given by our distinguished guests: Professor Zdzisław Najder, University of Opole and Mr Yewhen Perelyhin, Director of Department of European Integration at Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

J.O.

PROFESSOR ZDZISŁAW NAJDER

UNIVERSITY IN OPOLE

You have already heard a great deal of information and explanations given by the two previous speakers. My task is made simpler as well by three publications that have appeared recently, which I recommend to all of you. *Poland and Ukraine: a Strategic Partnership in a Changing Europe* by Mr. and Mrs. Wolczuk, who are professors in Birmingham, and two booklets published by the Center for Eastern Studies: *Ukraine – Another View* by Paweł Wołowski as well as *Eastern Policy - The Perspective of the Visegrad Countries*. I will try to integrate this material somewhat, and in my reasoning I will refer to examples and issues contained in these publications. I would also like to add that in talking about structures of the Euro-Atlantic relations of Ukraine - I found a recent booklet *Ukraine and NATO* by Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz to be useful.

In my speech I will cover these four topics:

1. Ukraine's attitude towards the EU
2. The EU's attitude towards Ukraine
3. The role of Poland
4. Prospects for the future

1. We have already heard a lot of Ukrainian proclamations relating to the "European choice" of this country. This European choice was announced five years ago by president Kuczma, later however when the "Zlenka doctrine" appeared, it practically eliminated this choice. There were many programs, there were new 'Europeanizing' regulations and offices, but the lack of state reform, to which Chairman Oleksandr Moroz referred still exists. There has been no separation from the pattern of oligarchy entangled with democracy and undermined by corruption, a lack of fully formed political parties, and the media are controlled and pressured by the government.

I believe that the political criterion for membership in the European Union are not appreciated within many circles in Ukraine. Even if Ukraine's economy develops twice as quickly, without fulfillment of these criterion we can not even talk about the association treaty because the rule-of-law and functioning democracy requirements are fundamental to the EU.

After obtaining independence Ukraine justly proposed a new geopolitical view for this part of Europe, but this was a NEW and surprising view for all, with the exception of Poland (and Russia, which saw in it as serious threat to its interests and did not spare any effort to oppose it). Ukraine was supposed to play a key role as a country liberated from Soviet - Russian domination, building a dam against Russian imperialism - while at the same time creating the potential for a durable stabilization of Eastern Europe. Zbigniew Brzeziński who was quoted many times today wrote a great deal about this. It required a new approach. Unfortunately Ukrainians offered Europe declarations, papers but not actions. What James Sherr, who is present here today, wrote five years ago: "Ukraine's political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration" - integration by decree - "or simply by joining and participating in international organizations and political clubs rather than undertaking concrete structural changes." And four years later the Wolczuks, who as far as I know are Mr. Sherr's students wrote: "notwithstanding declarations by Ukrainian foreign policy officials, the European choice barely figures in the domestic political debate and does not inform policy making in Kiev." Ukraine is certainly very important for Europe, but only because of its size, as a result of the importance of its population, economic deficiencies and political immaturity a gigantic problem is created, from which it is easiest and most comfortable to simply run away.

The actions of Ukraine's government suggest that it is an escape. The main signs of inconsistency are not only the lack of internal change, especially political, about which we have already talked, but also its unclear relationship with Russia, the lack of clear demarcation of borders, as well as guarding these borders, and the still ambiguous membership of Ukraine in the CIS. From what Minister Tarasyuk said we can draw the conclusion that gymnastic splits become the specialty of Ukraine: one thing is being said to Moscow, and something else to Brussels. This can look good on the balance bars, but in practical life causes trouble.

One last example. On the 15th of March *Rzeczpospolita* published an interview with Serhij Tyhypko, the president of the National Bank of Ukraine. I quote: "we will do everything possible to allow Ukraine's integration into the European Union as quickly as possible, but at the same time we will not give up cooperation with neighbouring countries. We want to begin with the creation of a free economic zone for Ukraine and Russia." [*Rzeczpospolita*, 15-16 March 2003.] At this stage these are two conflicting goals. Mister Tyhypko should have noticed, how many problems Poland had in its accession negotiations with the EU caused by our internal special economic zones; so you can imagine what would

happen if it was an economic zone, which had embraced the Russian Federation!

In a Center for Eastern Studies report Paweł Wołowski writes: "the European choice [of Ukraine] can be seen as a project implemented without consistency, exerting however a certain influence on the thinking of the elite and the functioning of the state. It also seems to be a strategy, the goal of which is not to participate in any structures dominated by Russia." [P. Wołowski, *Ukraine. Another view*, Warsaw, 2003.] I agree but it should be added that it is a strategy of dodges, not bringing them any closer to the goal.

2. The EU's attitude towards Ukraine. It is an attitude of indifference or in the best case one of restraint. It is possible to be appalled by it and I myself am often appalled by it, but these are the facts and our feelings will not change anything. We should take action; the question is in what way. That is the goal of this conference. Today Ukraine is practically nonexistent in the European political consciousness, and in the American. Since Ukraine relinquished its atomic weapons, it has faded into the background for the USA. Especially following the 11th of September 2001, when Russia went around Ukraine to the west, becoming an important ally for President Bush.

Recently the European Union has been talking about being neighbours more willingly, and about the 'New neighbourhood', rather than partnership, this document was mentioned by Mr. Pereyhin. Not a word has been said about association. In Kiev this creates understandable disappointment and criticism from within the government as we have heard from Mr. Moroz's mouth. To the long list of Ukrainian acts of negligence and avoidance I will add two examples from my own yard, which I am observing closely. First: three and a half years ago, following the conference in Paris organized by the French Institute of International Affairs (the IFRI) and the Eastern Institute in Lublin, a Polish - Ukrainian - French dialogue committee was created. This committee still isn't functioning because Ukraine never appointed its representative. Second: if I remember correctly for three years now there has been no Ukrainian ambassador in Paris. These are facts, which speak for themselves.

Neither individual governments of the member's states of the EU, nor their societies are particularly interested in Ukraine. And I do not only mean that the subject of Ukraine is absent in the foreign policies of their governments. It is possible to convince a government somehow; its harder to deal with the indifference of its citizens. This is the greatest difficulty to overcome. However I would caution against trying to overcome it using the formula of 'old and new Europe'. This is the trap set up by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and it should be avoided. I will refer to what president Vaclav Klaus said the day before yesterday:

If we follow the road of dividing Europe in this way, then it will turn out badly for everyone. The point is that until a citizen of the European Union, an average citizen, at least feels the possibility that when he goes to Ukraine he feels that he is still in Europe - until then we will not be able to change this attitude of indifference and reluctance. And at this time it is hard to even talk about such a feeling.

I visit Ukraine two or three times a year not because I have family connections there, but because I want to go there and each time I experience a mixture of very positive and negative feelings. I will not explore this further, but we need to understand this basic fact: If we are lucky it will take us fifteen years to join the EU. The basic component of this gradual approach to entry was that people from the west could come to Poland and feel more or less like they were in a very poor province of their own country. Obviously, Poland has considerably better geographical position and has had more luck historically, not to mention having a better political and economic situation. This isn't about whose fault it is. What is important is a real feeling of the practical possibility of traveling, staying overnight, relations with the government, and the atmosphere of public places beginning with gas stations and ending with local administrative offices. In one word: it is about adapting the country to a more civilized level, and not the president's declarations that will create the time horizon for serious consideration of Ukraine's accession to the EU.

At the end of last year Turkey appeared as very serious competition for Ukraine, a competitor, from whom it was possible to learn a lot. Turkey is obviously a country less European than Ukraine in the cultural sense, it raises many political doubts, its relations with minorities (or rather with one big Kurdish minority) are considerably worse than in Ukraine, but what our Ukrainian guests ask about justly, the initiation of the candidate country prospects for Turkey was however, supported by Germany and France, because of their concrete interests. Namely that there are many Turks living in Germany, and France has a relationship with Maghreb region. Moreover - and this argument speaks to others, and first of all to the British- they see in Turkey a way to lessen the tension between the world of western culture and the world of Islam. It is not a certainty however, that Turkey will ever join the European Union and if it does, then whether it will be the same Union, that has been existing so far.

The point is that Ukraine does not have the same advantages, there are none that speak on behalf of Ukraine at this time. In saying this I realize that it may be unpleasant for our Ukrainian friends to hear, but they have to realize and remember, that with the exception of Poland no one wants to talk about Ukraine now. This does not mean that Poles demand some

kind of privileges or special gratitude. We support Ukraine not only out of sentiment or because of historical reasons, but also for our own security. I mention this, not out of Polish boastfulness, but as an appeal to realism. Ambassador Jerzy Łukaszewski warned several times and warned justly, that we should not over do our promotion of Ukraine, because we first have to enter ourselves, and we can not be a candidate as a single woman with a child, much bigger than herself. This is the matter of tactics and the need for particular tactics tells us a lot about what we still have to do.

The Wolczuks mention Ukraine's tendency to remain in a Russian zone. Not only does President Leonid Kuczma seem to be a powerful advocate of this attitude, but also there is yet another factor that we haven't mentioned during this conference. Russia will not remain passive. The Russian Ambassador in Kiev is not just a diplomatic officer; the fact that he is a former Prime Minister has a symbolic dimension. Russia will not sleep. We have to openly state that there is conflict of interest between Poland and Russia. We would like to attract Ukraine to the west and the western framework, while its in Russia's interest not to let Ukraine go to the west. It is that simple.

The Attitude of the EU could be influenced by a common foreign policy and security policy, but in the Eastern dimension such a policy does not really exist. Suggestions referring to the attitudes of the EU towards Ukraine are various. The experts of the Visegrad Group which wrote The Center of Eastern Studies booklet, that I have mentioned, talk about a common program for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia. Our Ukrainian guests want a separate program for Ukraine; from the Polish perspective this is the proper approach. Only placing Ukraine on the European horizon gives it a chance, there should be at least two separate Eastern policies, one concerning potential candidates for the EU, and a second for Russia, which will never be a candidate. Here we encounter a difficult paradox; on the one hand for Ukraine Russia is of the utmost importance, economically, historically and population wise, but on the other hand only by separating from Russia can Ukraine can become a visible political partner for others. Some experts assert that Ukraine will never make this choice, which is something that Tadeusz Olszański reiterates. He is a pessimist and claims that Ukraine will never decide to layout and protect the border with Russia, because it would be too painful. He is not the only one who sais this, and it is not only in Poland where this is being expressed, it is a common opinion in the west - and at the same time is the position of the Russian government. The choice is in the hands of Ukraine. The choice is to follow the European political model, or the Russian one. Chairman Moroz expressed it in a rougher way: either with Russia or with the Union. This does not mean to be against Russia,

not at all. Finland, in choosing the European model, did not enter in any new conflicts with Russia.

3. The role of Poland. Two years ago, a discussion was initiated by Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, about the weakness of Polish instruments of economic and political influence on our eastern neighbours. I believe that we have made many mistakes in our policy towards Ukraine. The government of Poland and Polish opinion makers pay too much attention to border and visas issues. (President Tyhypko has a positive opinion on the economic function of the introduction of visas; claiming that it will result in a greater economic order. His opinion pleased me, because I am not an economist myself and have claimed the same thing for a long time now). However it was considerably more important and also more difficult to support the development of civil society in Ukraine. It pleased me greatly, that Chairman Moroz encouraged us to offer opinions on the public issues of Ukraine and to encourage others to do so. There was also a heated discussion among Polish friends of Ukraine about whether or not we should tell the Ukrainians the unpleasant truth. Should we talk openly about how far from fulfilling European criterion and expectations they are? Or to stroke them and say like Jacek Kuroń: " I understand Ukrainians"? Of course we understand, but from this understanding nothing results. When a doctor says that he understands his patients, they both feel good for a while, but it does not help the progress of therapy. It is obvious that Ukraine as a state and as a society requires intensive therapy, and there is a necessity of a deeper and more widespread consciousness concerning the diseases and what treatments should be applied. I was pleased to hear the opinion of Mr. Moroz. A few months ago when we attended a conference in Przemyśl with Minister Onyszkiewicz, Prime Minister Mykoła Żułyński expressed the same opinion: "tell us the bitter truth, it will make it easier for us". I believe this should be the unpleasant role of the Polish friends of Ukraine.

But now we have to look critically at ourselves. As I mentioned, the change of position and tactics of the European Union towards Ukraine can be influenced by the CFSP. Until now the approach of Poland to this common policy was passive or even reluctant, and now suddenly Poland demands common action for the sake of a country with as little security as Ukraine. So on the one hand we are not interested in the CFSP, but on the other we bet on a very risky card. There is an internal contradiction here. I remember that Brzeziński said that an independent Ukraine is more important for Poland, than a membership in the North-Atlantic Alliance. This is a very radical view, but it demonstrates a certain way of thinking. We have to be clear about our principle goals as well as what our resources are.

I repeat stubbornly that membership in NATO is a means to reach our goals, it is not a goal in itself, that membership in the EU and its institutions should be treated as a means to reach our state and national goals, and to achieve our common European goals. No one can force Ukraine to be independent, Ukrainians must decide for themselves about that. Our goal is to strengthen its independence, and to look for ways to do it. I believe we are looking in a very incompetent way. The development of events in recent weeks illustrates this. The situation is worse than it was half a year ago. Poland in the matter of the dispute between the U.S. and a majority of EU states, first of all France and Germany, made a choice. It made this choice in a reflexive way, without thinking and in my opinion caused its marginalization in Europe. We did not strengthen the United States and weakened our own position, hurrying too much to raise our hand although nobody asked for it. I believe that automatic support for Washington by Warsaw is to the disadvantage of Ukrainian interests. Therefore, if we were able to maintain a position between the two extremes (like Holland did), or at had least consulted others within the framework of the Weimar Triangle then we could have had a larger influence on events, and European ears would be more open to our opinions. At this time Europeans are barely listening to us, because they hear in our voice only the echo of Washington. As a result, the already weak influence of the only country supporting Ukraine's accession to the EU, has become even more limited. For me this confirms the thesis, that Poland should have one foreign policy, and not separate eastern and western policies. We have certain goals in the east and we should achieve them by all means. The way to achieve our goal of reinforcing Ukraine's independence is a closer political cooperation with key states of the continent, namely Germany and France. Without them we will not accomplish anything or accomplish very little. After I criticized Ukraine for its mistakes I moved on to criticism of our own mistakes - which is our basic duty, because we are first of all responsible for ourselves.

4. Prospects. I am finishing in a pessimistic mood because I do not know how we will get out of the present crisis. The results of the war, which is going on at this moment will not play a large role because it is not about victory - the victory will surely come - but because we do not know what will happen later. However because of the lack of long range thinking about our goals and how we want Poland and its neighbours to be like in twenty years, we got muddled up in our foreign policy. Now even President Kwaśniewski affirms that Prime Minister Miller rushed too quickly, to sign the letter of the eight. I am afraid that we can't easily make up for this rush. The only consolation for me is that both our situations

deteriorated and our common problems can connect us and both sides will draw from these unpleasant experiences some useful but bitter lessons.

Thank you very much.

YEWHEN PERELYHIN

**DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION,
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE**

Thank you Mister Minister. First of all I would like to thank our Polish colleagues both in governmental, and non-governmental organizations for the attention given to Ukraine in the context of European integration. It motivates all of us: Ukrainian officials, government representatives and the members of non-governmental organizations to continue our work and to apply the European approach to the question of integration.

I believe that the future relations between Ukraine and European Union depend first of all on two main factors: the internal development of Ukraine and the future make up of the European Union. I believe none today can say what the new European Union will be like in even a few years, certainly not ten years from now. We know that today there are two visions - referred to as the "new" Europe and the "old" Europe. We do not know the final form of the European Union Constitution, which is now being worked on by the Convention. There is also a lack of clarity on many other issues, especially those concerning the borders of the enlarged EU.

Ukraine bases its methods for building future relations with the EU on two principle foundations.

First the European Union will continue to develop based on a policy of integration. This will enable the development of relations between Ukraine and the enlarged EU through a consistent and all-embracing integration of Ukraine with the European Union. Introduction of this principle will also create a basis for answering the challenges, which the new EU will create. This is the basis for us. The process of integration can not be stopped.

Next, we have the issue of the European Union being open to all other European countries fulfilling the requirements for future membership. Ukraine, which has professed the desire to join the European Union and is consistently implementing integration policy, expects the UE to confirm the prospects of Ukraine for integration.

Moreover, while discussing the scenario for development of relations between Ukraine and European Union it is necessary to analyze the present circumstances of Ukraine, present regulations regarding relations between Ukraine and the EU as well as the goals of Ukraine.

As we know the basic document describing the regulation of relations between Ukraine and the European Union is the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. To be honest, this document does not apply to the present situation. This document is outdated both in its content, and in regard to the present political situation. The legal framework of this document does not correspond to the need for the development of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and the enlarged EU, and the fulfillment of the primary geopolitical goal of our country, which is accession to the European Union.

The mechanisms and tools that can be applied according to the existing Agreement are inconsistent with the intent of the European Commission to deepen cooperation with Ukraine. Therefore, future relations between Ukraine and the EU can not develop based solely on the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. It is necessary to look for new forms and frameworks for legal relations between Ukraine and the European Union.

You know, that for the last three or four weeks there has been a stormy debate concerning the appeal of the European Commission to the Council of European Union and The European Parliament within European countries, particularly in Ukraine. This document aroused in me and also in many Ukrainian politicians and officials what we call in English 'mixed feelings'. In the final version of the European Commission statement the original British concept of relations between an enlarged European Union and its eastern neighbours (first of all Ukraine) was transformed into a concept of relations between the enlarging European Union and its eastern neighbours, including Mediterranean countries and Russia. Why does this decision raise so many questions and doubts?

Today the European Union has a clear strategy for relations with Mediterranean countries. This refers of course to the Barcelona Process. The European Union is linked with Russia however, by the Northern Dimension policy. For three years there has been extensive work done on creating a common European economic framework between Russia and the EU. It in this context the paradigm of future relations for next 7 - 10 years becomes clear. As far as future East European Neighbours of the EU, especially Ukraine, there is no far-sighted or long-term concept for relations and therefore the necessity of creating the so-called Eastern Dimension appeared, meaning the new Eastern Policy of the EU. I am against using the term Eastern Dimension, because it is a broad term referring not only to the three neighbouring East European countries. We would like to suggest redefining this concept as the East European Dimension in the future external policy of the enlarged European Union. The European Commission endeavored in this the way to unify its strategy, suggesting the same principles of conduct both for the countries, which because of their geographical position will

never accede to the European Union, and for countries for whom a European destiny does not raise any doubts. Whether or not Ukraine enters the European Union, depends first of all on Ukraine and whether it will manage to do its homework, namely if it will implement internal political, economic and legal reforms.

Another contradiction in the strategy accepted by the European Commission is that on the one hand at the beginning it was stressed that the prospect of European membership, was the most effective stimulus for the introduction of internal reforms by the candidate countries. On the other hand the document later states that the issue of prospective membership for any East European countries is not discussed in this document. After all Ukraine isn't formulating the question about membership yet, we are realists and understand that such questions are not yet possible. Ukraine is talking about its prospects for membership and whether the European Union will be accessible. I want to stress this, so there is no misunderstanding. This only regards prospects because afterwards everything depends on the country and how it implements the reforms of the program.

To conclude my analysis of this questionable strategy, I would like to examine the possible introduction by the European Commission, of the "3 + 1" formula for regional cooperation. The intention is for it to be used as one of the main instruments of future cooperation in this region. What I am referring to is the formula embracing Ukraine, Belorus, Moldavia and Russia. Why does this raise questions? Because between these four countries a framework of cooperation already exists, and its future functioning as well as further integration within this framework exclusively will not bring any positive results in the field of political and economic reforms. A positive effect can be achieved by extending regional cooperation to all countries of the region. What I mean here is the cooperation between Ukraine and countries of Visegrad Group. We can also talk about cooperation in and development of the integration processes within the framework of the Riga Initiative. Until now the following situation existed between Ukraine and the European Union: on the one hand both sides recognized the need for acceleration of relations, and even the creation of a new framework for it. On the other hand, these relations were unnecessarily limited by the cooperation characterizing contacts with countries having no European prospects. We believe that it is time to implement the rule: from partnership to association and from cooperation to integration.

Because in the new agreement there should first of all be consideration of the four issues now forming the basis of cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union. First is the issue of policy and security. We have already gone beyond the framework outlined

by the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. Today we need a more active political dialogue between Ukraine and European Union.

I mean that according to the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation all decisions of common institutions, such as the Cooperation Council, have an advisory character, in contrast to institutions of the candidate countries within the framework of the Association Council. The new agreement can not be just between neighbouring countries, as the European Commission suggests. Ukraine proposes in the new agreement to make the decisions of common institutions obligatory.

Another issue that requires common legal frameworks - is the matter of the European system of security. Independent Ukraine has proved its ability in practice to bring a concrete contribution to the European security system. I will bring up only two examples. Ukraine is leading active discussions with the European Union about the implementation of the agreement by the EU to use Ukrainian long-range aircraft to transport the Common Joint Task Forces. Ukraine is also active in peacekeeping under the aegis of the European Union. You know that Ukraine, under the auspices of the European peace mission, voluntarily sent its representatives to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, together with representatives of all European Union member countries, and along with the candidate countries there are now five policemen from Ukraine. This is a concrete contribution to stability in this region. Yet cooperation in the field of security is today still based on a one sided approach, namely the European Union decided that it will allow Ukraine a role in the European security system, but it is not regulated by any agreement on the side of the EU. Therefore, Ukraine is standing on the sidelines of this process. Therefore Ukraine claims that it is time for the contribution of Ukraine to the European security system to be part of a mutual agreement.

The second essential element, which should be considered in future relations between Ukraine and the EU, concerns economic issues and trade. Among experts we often hear voices of just criticism regarding the fact, that Ukraine did not reach a suitable economic and trade level to become an attractive partner for the European Union. According to data by the end of 2002 the European Union share of Ukraine export was about 24 %. If we add to this count the 10 countries, which will become members of the EU next year then the common share will rise to 33%. During this time all the candidate countries reached the 50% level, therefore the trade between member countries and the European Union equals 50% and more in some cases. Let's look at this issue from a different perspective. Why didn't Ukraine reach and can't it reach such figures in the near future? The first cause is one of a historical nature and has to do with our relationships within the CIS. Obviously during the last ten years trade

developed within the framework of relationships from the time of the Soviet Union. Therefore it is necessary to have time to find new markets and create trust among new trade partners. On the other side, all candidate countries – and even the Balkan states which are not EU candidates today - participate within the internal markets of the European Union. Only Ukraine has a favored nation status, which in comparison with being a part of the free trade zone has less meaning and that is why it is so difficult to access the markets of the European Union. There is also the issue of antidumping procedures against Ukrainian enterprises as well as the limiting of the access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market. Taking into account these difficulties, Ukraine established a goal of the quickest possible entry to the WTO as well as to gain the status of a country with a free market economy. We expect from the European Union only appropriate preliminary action. We believe that in the matter of giving Ukraine free market status the EU should not apply double standards, and should solve this issue in our favor in the near future. The creation of a free trade zone would be an essential component of the new Agreement. Ukraine can not remain among the few European countries, which have not signed an agreement with the European Union regarding the free trade zone. The old Agreement on Cooperation and Partnership expresses only the possibility of the creation of such a zone. The Ukrainian side proposes a new legal document clearly describing specific actions with the aim of creating a free trade zone, obviously taking in to account the transitory period and asymmetric basis of it.

The third essential element of future relations concerns judicial matters and internal affairs. We know that legal issues and internal policies in relations with other countries are priority issues for the European Union. They include struggles with illegal emigration, organized crime, terrorism, with illegal arms trade and drug trafficking. Ukraine, as one of only three states, has signed a unique agreement with the European Union; this document is a plan for European Union operations concerning Ukraine's internal affairs and matters of justice. Such a document or its equivalent is just now being offered to other states, while in Ukraine it has been functioning for two years. On the other hand it is a 'one sided approach' document, concerning one-sided operations. Ukraine appears in this document as the object of cooperation. The Ukrainian side however wants Ukraine to become the subject of cooperation.

Therefore, these three pillars are a priority for both the European Union, and for Ukraine. The Ukrainian side is considering future concentration of its efforts towards creating new forms and scope of cooperation acceptable to both sides.

I would like to raise one more issue - the matter of technical help – before I finish discussing future relations. Poland knows perfectly well, what part technical help can play in fulfilling an agreement between the two sides, and also in internal reforms. I will quote just one example, to show you the difference between the technical help given to the candidate states, including Poland, and the help given to Ukraine. TACIS - is a help program aiming to help us by giving advice on how to act. PHARE and other programs are aiming towards help by creating an opportunity for institutions of these countries to cooperate in the European environment. Therefore, today Ukraine does not raise the issue of more money for technical support, but the change of philosophy for granting such help to Ukraine. Decide for yourself whether help, which it is regulated and granted on the same conditions to Mongolia and to Ukraine, with its European ambitions, can be effective? I would like to inform you that Ukraine receives the same technical support and on the same conditions as Mongolia. In front of us we have a necessary task of using the new philosophy, I would even say a new ideology of cooperation in granting technical support to Ukraine. The Ukrainian side is working on these tasks, and the European Union has recently recognized the legitimacy of this problem.

In conclusion I would like to talk about one more issue. Until now the new strategies of the European Union unfortunately have not been providing a clear vision of future foreign policy of the enlarged EU towards Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we expect that along with the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and other states of Central Europe, as well as the Balkan states, in the center of the united European Union there will be countries, which because of their own experiences will be able to convince the officers of the European Union, first of all in Brussels, but also within the old member states, that relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine should be built and developed exclusively through the prism of the future European prospect of Ukraine.

Thank you.

PANELISTS:

OPENING

Professor Bronisław Geremek, *Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland*

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, *Chairman of the European Integration of the Highest Council of Ukraine*

UKRAINE AND EUROPEAN UNION

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UKRAINE, NATO AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

Georgoj Kriuczukow, *Chairman of the Committee of National Security and Defence of the Highest Council of Ukraine*

Dr. Christof Weil, *Head of the Eastern European Partners Section, Political Affairs Division, International Staff, NATO*

Brig.Gen. Kazimierz Sikorski, *National Security Bureau*

Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, *DCAF Geneva*

UKRAINE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

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Professor James Sherr, *Conflict Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy*

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